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Decentralisation is theoretically expected to be a platform towards efficient provision of 
the local public goods and services. This is expected to boost economic growth due to efficient 
and effective utilisation of scarce fiscal resources. Nevertheless, the existing empirical studies 
present mixed results on this expected positive relationship among decentralisation and 
economic growth. Recently, the theories of fiscal federalism have also pressed upon the 
enabling environment for effective decentralisation; talking explicitly, an enabling institutional 
setup is required. The current study explores the complementarity between fiscal 
decentralisation and other institutions for stimulating growth and the study uses rich cross-
country panel data for the period 1984 to 2012, covering both the developing and developed 
countries of the world. The results suggest that positive relationship exist between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth for the developed countries while evidence was not 
found in the case of developing countries. Further, it was found that fiscal decentralisation and 
quality institutions are complementary for economic growth.  
JEL Classification: C22, H11, H77, O40 
Keywords: Fiscal Decentralisation, Institutions, Economic Growth, Panel Data, 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, there is an increasing trend towards decentralisation. 
Federal system provides the working environment to both the federal and lower tiers of 
the government (i.e. sub-national governments) to function within their domain for the 
betterment of their people. The history of federalism relates back to the American state 
and after World War II this debate became even more popular around the world. 
Federalism was basically looked upon as a replacement for the Imperial system that was 
prevalent till early 19th century. Linking the history, 13 states of the US felt weaker to 
the British Empire after the World War II, hence joined hands as a federation to achieve 
the common goal i.e. independence from foreign occupation [Khalid (2013)]. This 
provided the world with a new system, where the responsibilities are shared among 
different tiers of government and the nation stands united.   
The division of functions among different levels of government seems justified 
because the federal government bears the responsibility for issues that have a national 
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domain, while the lower tiers of government can focus mainly on her service provision 
role. Nevertheless, in many countries, the sub-national revenue sources are not sufficient 
to undertake the desired public services. Therefore, resource transfer from the top tier of 
government to lower tiers is essential for the increase in the welfare of the people at grass 
root level. In economic terms the national government is unable to achieve Pareto 
efficiency directly; instead the lower tiers of governments are the source of such 
efficiency because representatives are located near to their domain people and are 
cognizant of local preferences and needs. Thus decentralisation facilitates efficient 
resource allocation, thus leading to much bigger local participation, faster market 
development and this in turn improves economic growth. 
Studying the literature of fiscal decentralisation, it is built on two important 
assumptions: (1) local governments are better placed than the national government to 
deliver community services as a result of information advantages regarding local 
preferences; through this, decentralisation will enhance economic efficiency (2) 
competition and population mobility among local governments in favour of better 
community services will ensure the convergence of preferences of local communities 
[Tiebout (1956)].  
In terms of the First Generation (FG) Theory of fiscal decentralisation, it can 
enhance economic performance by ensuring economic proficiency regarding delivery of 
public services. These theories are based on different assumptions which favour local 
government for an optimal public financial system. The one presented by Hayek (1945) 
states that local government is in the better position to match the preferences of the local 
citizen. Similarly the idea of stabilisation, redistribution of income and efficient provision 
of public good has been given by Musgrave (1959). On the other hand, Olson (1969) 
gave the concept of “Fiscal Equivalence” in the process of fiscal decentralisation. Making 
a significant contribution, Oates (1972) supported the argument that the subnational 
government is in the position to deliver goods and services to local community according 
to their preferences. Hence, the FG theories discuss the positive implication of 
decentralisation and suggest that it will further enhance competition, efficiency and 
resultantly will promote economic growth. 
Nevertheless, existing empirical studies present mixed effects of fiscal 
decentralisation (FD) on economic growth both in developing and developed countries. 
There are a number of studies indicating a positive relation between FD and economic 
growth [Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003); Malik, et al. (2006); Oates (1993); Oates 
(1995); Yilmaz (1999) and Thiessen (2003)] inter alia. Still there are many studies which 
have found insignificant or in certain cases even negative relationship between FD and 
economic growth.
1
  
However, this gap between the theoretical and empirical results can still be 
explained from the literature. The SG theories are the extension of the FG theories of 
fiscal federalism that focus on the behaviour of the political agents in the political 
process. This work required to model the political institutions within the theories of fiscal 
decentralisation and also expands the literature on the problem like the asymmetric 
information, incentives and limitations of political processes [Vo. (2009)]. SG theories 
 
1See for example Oates (1972); Oates (1985); Davoodi and Zou (1998); Baskaran and Feld (2009); 
Akai and Sakata (2002); Rahman, et al. (2012); Tanzi (1996). 
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also focused on many economic rationales like principal-agent problem, theory of 
contract, theory of firms [Oates (2005)]. Thus the SG theories explain that difference in 
results can emerge for even a similar policy undertaken in different political scenarios.  
Further, there is a need to examine the role of relevant institutions and the presence 
of asymmetric information related to the success of the decentralisation process. Hence, 
well-managed institutions are the major policy handles through which decentralisation 
can influence long run economic growth objectives. In the words of Acemoglu and 
Robinson, “nations sometimes adopt inefficient institutions and achieve poverty”. 
Similarly North (1990) mentioned that “institutions are generally defined as the 
constraint that human beings impose on themselves”. Though, talking specifically of 
institutions; plethora of literature on the institutional mechanism is available that tried to 
explore the direct relationship between institutions and economic growth.
2
  Yet very few 
studies have linked institutions with decentralisation and thus this study will make a 
contribution to the literature in this context. 
 
1.1. Motivation of the Study 
There is huge literature available on the fiscal decentralisation, as well as 
institutions for their impact on economic growth, only a few studies
3
 have looked at their 
interaction and the corresponding impact on economic growth. Thus there is a need to 
analyse the situation for the fact that whether it is the „fiscal decentralisation‟ or 
„institutions‟ in isolation for considering the impact on the economic growth or these are 
complements to each other. Hence, there is need to contribute to the existing literature by 
providing evidence about the role of institutions in the effectiveness of the fiscal 
decentralisation process.  
This study tries to explore the effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation, while 
relating it to the quality of institutions. Main questions that this study seeks to find 
answers  are: Does fiscal decentralisation attains the objective of enhancing economic 
growth? Does the role of complementary institutions matter to enhance the economic 
growth of the country? Does incorporating the role of other institutions into the model 
help us find explanation for otherwise unexpected results?  
Overall, the contribution of this study is in finding out the empirical relationship 
regarding the effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation considering the role of other
4
 
complementary institutions in developing and developed countries. Complementary 
institution, i.e. quality of governance is considered for this study and two proxies 
including “control over corruption” and “democratic accountability” are used to represent 
it. This study targets to find out that whether or not the differences in institutional quality 
has resulted in differing results related to the effect of fiscal decentralisation on economic 
growth. Thus, this study will examine the role of fiscal decentralisation and 
complementary institution in achieving higher economic growth. 
 
2See for example Acemoglu, et al. (2006); Rodrik, et al. (2004); Sarwar, et al. (2013); Vijayaraghavan 
and Ward; Kalonda, et al. (2014); Potrafke (2011); Knack and Keefer (1995); Nawaz (2015); Ahmad and Hall 
(2012). 
3Like, Iqbal, et al. (2013) focused on the role of democratic institution on the process of FD in single 
country case. Iimi (2005) also tested the hypothesis with international cross sectional data that political freedom 
and fiscal decentralisation are complementary. 
4Because decentralised set up, too, represent a specific institution. 
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Specifically, the objectives of this study are: 
(i) To investigate the relationships between the fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth using the recently available rich cross country panel data.
5
 
(ii) To analyse the role of complementary institutions in materialising the link 
between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth.   
This study improves onto the existing literature by analysing the role of 
institutions in the effectiveness of fiscal decentralisation, which, ultimately is believed to 
lead towards economic growth. Current study takes benefit from World Bank‟s panel 
data regarding the fiscal decentralisation indicators that is recently made available. Given 
study is based upon the endogenous growth model and used appropriate econometric 
technique like Baltagi and Wu (1999) that especially deals with unequally spaced panel 
data. In addition, this study also yield some policy suggestions on the basis of the results 
analysing that whether fiscal decentralisation and quality of governance are 
complementary so as to bring better economic growth.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises the literature 
concerned with the growth effect of Fiscal Decentralisation and Institutions. The 3
rd
 
section of this study presents the theoretical link. Section 4 contains econometric model, 
empirical methodology and data. Section 5 includes result and discussion, while, Section 
6 contains conclusion of the study and presents the major policy implications. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In recent decades, the rapid rise in the sovereignty and responsibilities of sub-
national government tiers are one of the most notable trends in governance, especially in 
emerging and transition economies. There is decent literature available examining the 
growth effects for different countries emerging through fiscal decentralisation. The 
overtime development suggested in the literature can be summarised in figure as below:  
 
 
5The previous version of the GFS was contained the data from 1972 to 2012 but current study is using 
rich cross country data from the period 1972 to 2014. As this study incorporates institutions and the data on 
institutions is available from 1984 to 2012 for this reason current study is using same time period.   
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All these risks are discussed in the Second Generation Theories (SG) of fiscal 
federalism that has emerged as the sufficient condition for the success of fiscal 
decentralisation process. It is obvious that Institutions play vital role on the domestic 
economic environment ensuring political stability, high stock of social capital, protection 
of property rights, well-organised judiciary system, low risk of expropriation [Jutting 
(2003)]. So the body of literature determined the economic growth-institutions nexus 
directly and indirectly.  
 
 
6[Oates, W. E (1972); Oates, W. E (1985); Davoodi, H. and H. Zou (1998); Baskaran, T. H. and Feld, 
L. P. (2009); Akai and Sakata (2002); Rahman, et al. (2012); Tanzi (1996); Iqbal, et al. (2013)]. 
Literature6 has Identified many Reasons 
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On the basis of presented literature review, this section come up with the 
conclusion that the under lying causes of the weak or no relationship between FD and 
economic growth are imbedded in weak economic, cultural, geographical and 
institutional setup. Hence, one of the major constraints in the FD process to promote 
economic growth is weak institutions. Without effective institutions, growth process of 
the country is difficult to run in the way desired. Therefore, current study incorporates 
institutions in the growth enhancing process of the fiscal decentralisation and tries to fill 
the missing gap.  
 
3.  THEORETICAL MODEL 
The discussion in the previous section shows that the fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth nexus needs more effort to get explained. The growth effect of fiscal 
decentralisation can realise from both the direct and indirect channels. So, on the basis of 
the previous section, a theoretical model is developed here to conceptualise the 
relationship between the fiscal decentralisation and economic growth, incorporating the 
role of complementary institutions in the process.  
 
3.1.  Decentralisation Categories  
Decentralisation is the process of transfer of authorities and responsibilities from 
national to sub-national government. According to the definition, there are three 
categories of decentralisation. 
(i) Political decentralisation, (ii) Administrative decentralisation, iii) Fiscal 
decentralisation  
Political decentralisation is how opinion of citizens is unified into policy decision, and 
how civil society can hold powers and officials to account at the different levels of the 
government. Similarly, administrative decentralisation is how responsibilities and authorities 
for policies and decisions are shared among different level of the government. While, fiscal 
decentralisation is how expenditure, revenues and borrowing shared among different level of 
the government. To keep the comparison with other studies simple, this study uses the 3rd 
definition namely fiscal decentralisation and theoretical model is presented as below.  
 
3.2. Theoretical Explanation  
In this study, endogenous growth model has been used to capture the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth. Davoodi and Zou (1998) explained how fiscal 
decentralisation can be instrumental for economic growth. By using the same model, the said 
study extended Barro‟s (1990) endogenous growth model by assuming that public spending is 
carried out by three level of government: federal, local and state. The level of fiscal 
decentralisation is defined as the ratio of spending by the subnational government to total 
government spending i.e. Fiscal decentralisation increases if spending by state and local 
government rises relative to spending by the federal government [Davoodi and Zou (1998)]. 
Current study further extends the Davoodi and Zou (1998) model by including other 
institutions in the productions function, assuming that fiscal decentralisation and institutions 
are complementary. If institutional quality is better than the process of fiscal decentralisation 
can be effective and ultimately promote growth. 
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4.  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The objective of this section is to design the econometric model which is based on 
the theoretical model. Moreover, an empirical methodology is used to test the hypotheses 
of the model developed to examine the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth.  
 
4.1. Estimation Model 
The relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth elaborated 
in the last section helps us to develop the empirical version of the model. It is noteworthy 
that the contribution of this study is that it introduces institutional quality to the Davoodi 
and Zou (1998) model in judging the enabling environment for fiscal decentralisation for 
it being effective. The main assumption of this study is that without the role of institution, 
the benefits of the fiscal decentralisation will remain limited. So, to capture the true 
impact of fiscal decentralisation, this study will incorporate the quality institutions 
playing a complementary role in the process of fiscal decentralisation using data from 
developed and developing countries.  
It is important to note here that Iimi (2005) have used this framework by using 
the interactive term of fiscal decentralisation and political freedom in the model. This 
study will instead use the two main variants of the existence of good institutions (i.e. 
Control over corruption, Democratic accountability) and accordingly their interaction 
term with fiscal decentralisation will be considered to analyse the effectiveness of 
fiscal decentralisation for better economic growth. The empirical equation to analyse 
the model for fiscal decentralisation, institution and economic growth can be defined 
as: 
git = β0 + β1GEit + β2FDit + β3INSikt + β4FDit * INSikt + β5Xit + uit … … (4.1) 
Where i (=1...I ) and t (=1….N) refers to the country i at time t; I denotes the number 
of the countries while N represents the time period; β0, β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5 are the 
scalar parameters; git is the GDP per capita growth rate for country i  at time t, GE is 
the government expenditure as percentage of GDP. FDit represent the measures of 
fiscal decentralisation, INSikt represents variables for institutional quality (k indicates 
the above mentioned two distinct variables) and lastly X indicates the vector of other 
key control variables affecting growth. Uit is the error term while X consists of the 
variables i.e. trade openness, human capital, physical capital, inflation, growth rate 
of population and urbanisation. In this model the interaction term FD*INS is the 
focus of attention and allow us to test the hypothesis that whether or not fiscal 
decentralisation and institution are complementary. So, this study ends up with given 
equation for the analysis. Further, the control variables included in this model are 
those that have been used in the literature as identified by Mankiw, et al. (1992), 
Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro and Lee (1996) Nawaz (2015) Martinez-Vazquez 
and Mcnab (2001).  
Table 4.1 provides basic definitions for each variable alongside the sources of 
data. While expected relationship of explanatory variables with economic growth are 
elaborated in Section 4.2. 
768 Ahmad, Arif, and Khalid 
4.2. Relationship of Explanatory Variables with Economic Growth 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
In this current study, our main variable of interest is fiscal decentralisation. When 
policy regarding the resource allocation is better it will positively affect the GDP per 
capita. Current study has used Expenditure approach (ED) to measure fiscal 
decentralisation which is captured as a ratio of sub-national government share of 
expenditure to total government expenditure (national plus sub-national). This indicator 
has been used in multiple studies to quantify the effect of FD.
7
  
 
Government Expenditure  
Government expenditure is the basic explanatory variable of the FD model. Government 
expenditure is measured as the percentage of GDP and the expected sign is positive.  
 
Institutional Quality  
Institutional quality is expected to positively affect economic growth. This is our main 
variable and it is considered as the powerful tool behind the economic growth. Better 
institutional quality helps the country to catch the path of the economic development. Current 
study used two proxies to capture the true picture of institutional quality. These proxies are 
„control over corruption‟ and „democratic accountability‟. Multiple studies have found and 
confirmed the positive relationship.
8
 Jointly these proxies are expected to give us an 
appropriate environment for growth and stability of the country. 
 
FD*INS  
The interaction term will show the complementarity between the institutions, and FD. 
FD, if combined with better institutions is expected to deliver better results and hence the 
interaction term will capture the effect of this interaction on the economic growth. However 
the positive relationship depends both on FD and IQ measures. If institutional quality is low it 
will worsen the impact on the economic growth and vice versa. On the other side, due to the 
issues in the FD, economic growth may not get improved. Therefore, it is necessary to look at 
the interaction / joint impact of (FD x INS) on the economic growth.  
The vector Xit consists of a set of independent variables which is identified by 
many authors
9
 as the important control variables for the cross country growth regression.  
 
Inflation  
Inflation can bring both the negative and positive influence on the economic 
growth. There are two schools of thought on the relationship between inflation and 
economic growth. One argues that there is negative relationship between the two on the 
basis of Real Business Cycle (RBC) theories. Kydland and Prescott (1990) argued that 
supply shocks are responsible for the negative relationship rather the demand shocks and 
 
7See for example Davoodi and Zou (1998); Iimi (2005); Rodríguez‐pose and Krøijer (2009).  
8See for example Acemoglu, et al. (2004); Hall and Jones (1999); Knack and Keefer (1995); Rodrik, et 
al. (2004); Nawaz (2015); Nigar (2013). 
9See for example Levine and Renelt (1992); Davoodi and Zou (1998); Iimi (2005); Iqbal, et al. (2013); 
Nawaz (2015); Martinez-Vazquez and Mcnab (2001).  
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argued that after the certain threshold level, inflation is harmful for the growth. While the 
other school of thought, argues that inflation can influence positive on the economic 
growth the said positive relationship is based on the Philips curve [see e.g. Paul, et al. 
(1997) and Mallik and Chowdhury (2001)]. So, the study will reveal whether inflation 
causes positive or negative effect on the economic growth.  
 
Human Capital  
Human capital is measured by using secondary school enrolment gross percentage 
without using age and gender configuration and expected sign of the human capital is positive.  
 
Physical Capital  
Physical capital is measured by gross fixed capital formation as percentage of 
GDP and expected sign is positive. Thus, the physical capital promotes economic growth.  
 
Table 4.1 
Variables Names, Definition and Sources of Data 
Variable                 Names Definition Source 
Dependent 
Variable 
git GDP per capita growth rate (annual %)  World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
List of independent Variable 
Expenditure 
Decentralisation 
fdexp Percentage of Sub-National Expenditure/ Total 
Expenditure(National plus sub-national)  
IMF- Government 
Financial Statistics 
Government 
Expenditure 
Ge Government expenditure as % of GDP World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Trade Openness Op (Imports plus Exports) as % of GDP  World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Human Capital Hc School enrolment, secondary (% gross) 
 
World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Physical Capital K Gross fixed capital formation as % of GDP World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Inflation Inf % change in CPI (consumer price index) annual World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Growth rate of 
population 
pgr Population growth % (annual) World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Urbanisation  urb Urban population as % of total World Development 
Indicator (WDI) 
Control Over 
Corruption 
Cc “This is an assessment of corruption within the 
political system that causes distortion in the economic 
and financial system, reduces the efficiency of public as 
well as private sector by enabling the people to hold 
positions of power through patronage rather than 
ability and creates instability in political system. 
Ranges between 0 (very high risk) and 6 (very low 
risk)”. ICRG Definition 
PRS Group 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
 
 
 
 
Democratic 
accountability 
Da This is an assessment of how responsive government is 
to its people, by assuming that the less responsive it is, 
the more likely it is that the government will fall, 
peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly 
violently in a non-democratic one. Ranges between 0 
(very high risk) and 6 (very low risk). ICRG Definition 
PRS Group 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
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Openness 
Trade openness is defined as the total trade (i.e. sum of the Import and Export) as 
percentage of GDP and it is expected that due to the trade openness economic growth 
will stimulate. 
 
Urbanisation  
Urban population enjoy better infrastructure and facilities as compared to rural 
population. Urbanisation is defined as the urban population as percentage total population 
and it is expected to have positive effect on the GDP growth rate per capita.  
 
Population Growth Rate  
Population growth rate is also used in the regression equation to find its effects on 
the GDP growth.  
 
4.3.  Data  
For the sample selection at cross country level, data availability played an 
important role. In year 2014 the World Bank launched a rich cross country data of the 
fiscal decentralisation indicators providing observations from 1972-2014; however, the 
data coverage is not universal. However, as discussed earlier, this study also incorporates 
institutions in the process of the FD as suggested by the SG theory of fiscal federalism. 
But the data for institutions is available for countries ranging from 1984 to 2012 
therefore, the same data range to be used for this study‟s. On the progressive sideway, the 
availability of new rich cross country panel data provides a chance to outspread research 
on this topic and helps in re-estimating the evidence with upgraded data. 
The updated fiscal decentralisation dataset gives the information for 96 countries. 
However, due to the unavailability of data for other indicators, current study end up with 
43 countries which includes 29 developed counties and 14 developing countries. The list 
of the sample countries included in the Table A1, at Appendix. The sample countries are 
not the same but nearly similar to that used by the prior studies [Davoodi and Zou (1998); 
Iimi (2005)]. Current study combined the two groups (lower middle income and upper 
middle income) countries into one sub-group i.e. “Developing Countries”. The other 
group contained the High income OECD countries refer to as “Developed Countries”.  
This study has used unbalanced panel data set because for some countries there 
were gaps within the series. The main variable (i.e. Fiscal Decentralisation) has gaps 
within the series, though rest of the indicators are complete/balanced including the 
dependent variable. Missing values within the fiscal decentralisation indicator leaves us 
with the unbalanced panel data. The data sources for variables are the World 
development indicators published by the World Bank. To measure the quality of 
institution, this study uses different indicators of the institution from the ICRG data set 
and Government Financial Statistics (GFS).  
 
4.4. Estimation Methodology 
Using extensive data set for this study have both benefits and risks. Benefits can be 
mentioned as the rich and improved data coverage across the countries and time while 
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issue can be highlighted as the missing observations in the series resulting in unbalanced 
panel for available countries. Moreover, the differences exist in the countries due to level 
of; basic infrastructure, development, endowments, public preferences, governance etc. 
However, panel data methodology is able to cater with these kinds of issues and is used 
universally to conduct the policy analyses.  
There are number of the estimation methods available to calculate the panel data 
sets which can handle the cross country heterogeneity. As highlighted by Akai and Sakata 
(2002), a critical problem with panel data is that it is difficult to measure the cultural and 
institutional differences among countries. Evidently, high income countries have higher 
degree of development and governance than low income countries while growth rate in 
developed countries is also relatively high as compare to developing countries. What is 
right between “Fixed effect” and “Random effect” model, the Hausman Specification 
Test was conducted and the evidence suggested that result of fixed effects model is 
consistent and efficient. So, the current study uses “Fixed effect” to capture the individual 
cross country differences. 
There are many methods with balanced panel to capture the growth effect of fiscal 
decentralisation with different scenario but based on the given information to tackle the 
unbalanced panel data, which has missing observation issue, the one to fit best can be 
pointed out as the Baltagi and Wu (1999) method for the analysis. The Baltagi and Wu 
(1999) method is specially designed for the unbalanced panel. This method can give 
better results when disturbance term is first order autoregressive and can estimate both 
the fixed effects and random effects models. The estimator also account for the panel 
heteroscedasticity and for the panel specific error autocorrelation. Therefore, the Baltagi 
and Wu (1999) model suites this data set the best.  
 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Empirical results for the estimation of the different institutional indicators and 
fiscal decentralisation measures on the GDP per capita growth rate are shown in the 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The discussion about the Baltagi and Wu (1999) models with FE and 
AR 1 disturbance are in more detail below. 
 
5.1. Fixed Effect Estimation Result    
The results for the effect of the Fiscal Decentralisation indicator with institutions 
indicators on the economic growth are discussed as under. The main focus remains on the 
variables of interest, while the set of the other explanatory variables are discussed at the 
end. For the analysis, two regression models are run for the each set of the FD and 
institutions measures. The models 1, 3 include two indicators (FD and Institutions) 
separately while the others models 2, 4 include the relevant interaction terms to check the 
complementarities between the two for economic growth.  
 
5.1.1. Estimation Result with Control over Corruption 
Tables (5.1) and (5.2) report the empirical result of the Fiscal decentralisation with 
control over corruption on the economic growth. The impact of the fiscal decentralisation 
on the economic growth is captured by using FD measure both on developing and 
developed communities. Empirical evidence in Table (5.1) presents the expenditure 
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decentralisation with control over corruption. Result showed that expenditure 
decentralisation as well as control over corruption is positively and significantly related 
with the growth rate of per capita GDP in developed countries.   
The findings suggest that control over corruption i.e. better institutional framework 
scales up the economic events. When the corruption is minimum, the political and 
bureaucratic system helps in economic growth. Our findings are in conformity with the 
literature e.g. Mauro, (1995) and Podobnik, et al. (2008). Adding interaction term in 
model 2 of expenditure decentralisation, the coefficient of this interaction term has 
positive and significant effect. This indication is in the favour of the developed countries 
and also supported the proposition that fiscal decentralisation and control over corruption 
are complementary. This shows that the process of fiscal decentralisation is effective 
when control over corruption is high in the economies.  
Talking about the developing countries, the results seem different. Expenditure 
decentralisation has significantly negative impact on the EG. This negative association 
implies that the expenditure decentralisation has growth retarding impact in the 
developing countries. This result is divergent to what was expected from the expenditure 
decentralisation theory. However, Davoodi and Zou (1998) found similar results for the 
emerging economies. Control over corruption indicator shows the positive and significant 
result on the economic growth separately. By adding, the interaction term in the model 2, 
Table (5.2), show that there is negative association between the interaction term and 
economic growth. This negative association tells us that in the developing expenditure 
decentralisation and control over corruption are not complementary and not helping each 
other. The reason of this negative relationship is that the developing countries have less 
control over corruption and officials are involved in the rent seeking activities.       
 
5.1.2.  Estimation Result with Democratic Accountability 
With strong democratic institutions, fiscal decentralisation can positively affect the 
economic growth. Current study find the interactive term of FD with democratic 
accountability. The estimation results indicate that expenditure decentralisation has 
positive and significant impact on the economic growth for the developed countries. 
Democratic accountability also showed positive and significant association with the 
growth rate of per capita GDP in Table 5.1, model 3 and 4. This positive result indicates 
that those countries with strong democratic institutions are performing well. Helliwell, 
(1994), Nawaz (2015) and Rodrik, (2000) have found same result as this study found. 
Rodrik, (2000) argued that presence of strong democratic institutions the countries can 
stimulate economic growth by allowing accountability and stability in the system. 
However, the coefficient of the interactive term shows negative result when added the 
interaction term in the model. Therefore, the result is not supportive of the expectation 
that democratic accountability as being significantly complementary in catalysing the 
growth effect of fiscal decentralisation. 
The estimation result for the developing countries in the expenditure 
decentralisation model 3 showed that expenditure decentralisation and democratic 
accountability have negative and significant association with the economic growth rate, 
without adding the interaction term in the model. With the weak democratic institutions, 
the officials and the politicians have lesser checks on their authority and through this 
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these officials and politicians can easily engage in the rent seeking activities. By addition 
the interaction term of FD and DA in the model 4 the result seems to be different. The 
coefficient of the interaction term becomes negative and insignificant.  
 
5.1.3. Reasons of the negative effect of the Expenditure Decentralisation and 
Democratic Accountability on the Economic Growth 
The reasons of the negative sign of the expenditure decentralisation are that in the 
developing countries the provincial governments allocates excessive amount to the 
current expenditure instead of the capital and infrastructure outlay. Secondly, the decision 
of the provincial government about the spending does not always ensure efficiency and 
this result in unproductive outcomes. Third, there is the lack of the commitment in the 
both the governments (national and sub-national) about the expenditure. Fourth, 
provincial governments may have inefficient policies about the administrative training 
programs and also lack of the appropriate physical and human resources. Fifth, 
inappropriate revenue transfer is carried out among sub-national tiers of the government 
by using the central government tax instrument. Finally, the sub-national tiers of the 
governments have lack of the institutional infrastructure and they often lack the 
institutional setup to control corruption, ensure accountability and rent seeking activities 
which negatively impacts the economic growth.    
There are other angles of the analysis as well. The negative effect of the 
democratic accountability can be interpreted as the excessive liberty of the people makes 
it harder for the sub-national tiers to internalise the economies of scale in local public 
goods provisions. Further, the elected office-holders are more accountable for the local 
population; this might hamper the policy coordination and collaboration among the office 
holders. Iimi (2005) found similar result of interaction of FD and Political freedom and 
concluded that FD and political freedom are not complementary. It is noteworthy that 
Iimi (2005) showed the political freedom in term of accountability. This is the reason of 
the non-complementarity between the fiscal decentralisation and democratic 
accountability.   
After discussing the main variables of concern, the other control variables are also 
explained here. An increase in the public spending slows the economic growth both in 
developed and emerging economies. Iimi, (2005) showed similar result with tax to GDP 
ratio and conclude that higher tax to GDP ratio slows down the economic growth. 
Moreover, it is showed in the basic growth theory that higher population leads to lower 
GDP growth rate of per capita. So, current study also showed negative impact of the 
population growth rate on GDP per capita growth rate for the developed countries. 
Mahyudin and Hall (2012), Iimi (2005) and Davoodi and Zou, (1998) showed same result 
of negative relationship between the two. Physical capital is positively associated with 
growth rate of per capita. The current study also showed positive result between physical 
capital and GDP growth rate of per capita in the developed communities, implying that 
the countries can increase GDP per capita growth rate by investing more in the physical 
capital. Iqbal, et al. (2013) and Nawaz (2015) also presented similar impact on the GDP 
growth rate of per capita. For the developing countries, physical capital has negative 
significant impact on the growth rate per capita. This is the indication that the developing 
countries have less attention on the physical capital. The trade openness has significant 
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and positive impact on the economic growth rate per capita implying that trade is 
beneficial for the economies. This positive relation is associated with the benefits 
evolving from competition, economies of scale and specialisation. Multiple studies 
provided same result of this positive relationship [Iqbal, et al. (2013), Iqbal and Zaid 
(1998)]. Human capital is the determinant of the economic growth and theoretically have 
positive association between the two but current study found significant negative 
relationship between human capital and economic growth in the developing countries and 
insignificant for the developed countries. Rest of the independent variables i.e. (inflation 
and urbanisation) were found insignificant result. 
 
Table 5.1 
Result for the Effect of Fiscal Decentralisation on Economic  
Growth in Developed Countries 
Dependent Variable: GDP per 
capita Growth Rate (annual %) 
Control Over  
Corruption 
Democratic 
Accountability 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fdexp 0.0719* 0.0063** 0.0531 0.7982*** 
Cc 0.3634* 0.1070*   
fdexp*cc  0.0221*   
Da   0.8732* 3.7915*** 
fdexp*da    -0.1265*** 
Ge -1.0116*** -1.0086*** -1.0751*** -1.1874*** 
K 0.4225*** 0.4337*** 0.4197*** 0.3396*** 
Op 0.0569*** 0.0575*** 0.0494*** 0.0439*** 
Pgr -2.4752*** -2.4749*** -2.5203*** -2.4842*** 
Hc 0.0265 0.0258 0.0253 0.0062 
Inf -0.0303 -0.0300 -0.0162 -0.0393 
Urb -0.0429 -0.0415 -0.0543 -0.1493* 
Constant 5.5091** 6.5693** 5.3302** 0.4894 
Total  Obs. 376 376 376 376 
Countries 29 29 29 29 
Minimum Obs. 5 5 5 5 
Average Obs. 12.9655 12.9655 12.9655 12.9655 
Maximum Obs.  16 16 16 16 
R-Square 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 
Hausman  test  100.40 113.83 130.46 143.73 
chi2 (P-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
legend: *p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01 
#Fixed effects model estimated with Baltagi and Wu (1999), between cluster robust standard errors along with 
AR1 errors. 
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Table 5.2 
Result for the Effect of Fiscal Decentralisation on Economic  
Growth in Developing Countries 
Dependent Variable: GDP per 
capita Growth Rate (%) 
Control Over  
Corruption 
Democratic 
Accountability 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Fdexp 0.0244 -0.6662** -0.0003* 0.0362 
Cc 0.9680** 0.0856***   
fdexp*cc  -0.2344*   
Da   -3.4498* -3.2422 
fdexp*da    -0.0081 
Ge -1.8286*** -1.7658*** -1.9840*** -1.9939*** 
K 0.0661 0.0267 -0.1213* -0.1207* 
Op 0.1553** 0.1641** 0.1815** 0.1825** 
Pgr -2.2528 -3.1478 -1.3791 -1.3862 
Hc -0.1433 -0.1316 -0.3360** -0.3359** 
Inf -0.1928 -0.1899 -0.0256 -0.0314 
Urb -0.1535 -0.1803 0.6661 0.6495 
Constant 30.1426 13.9130 25.0961* 25.2585* 
Total  Obs. 75 75 75 75 
Countries 14 14 14 14 
Minimum Obs. 1 1 1 1 
Average Obs. 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 
Maximum Obs.  12 12 12 12 
R-Square 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.37 
Hausman  test  21.88 25.65 18.35 15.25 
chi2 (P-value) 0.0093 0.0042 0.0313 0.0844 
legend: *p<.1; **p<.05;***p<.01 
#Fixed effects model estimated with Baltagi and Wu (1999), between cluster robust standard errors along with 
AR1 error. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The relationship between the fiscal decentralisation and economic growth has 
significant consideration from the previous years. Multiple studies have shown positive 
as well as negative impact of the fiscal decentralisation on the economic growth. 
Therefore, current study examined the growth effect of fiscal by using endogenous 
growth model.  
Institutions plays significant role in the way of development corridor. Thus, 
current study incorporates different institutional measures in the process of fiscal 
decentralisation as suggested by SG theories of fiscal federalism and these measures are: 
control over corruption and democratic accountability. Current study used rich cross 
country panel data of 43 countries including 29 developed and 14 developing countries 
over the period 1984-2012, using unbalanced panel method given by Baltagi and Wu 
(1999) to investigate whether fiscal decentralisation has any growth impact and whether 
fiscal decentralisation and institutions are complementary.  
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The empirical examination shows that expenditure decentralisation is growth 
enhancing for the developed country but has no effect for the developing world. 
Decentralisation in responsibilities creates positive externalities and due to this positive 
externalities per capita income of the countries increases. It is concluded that fiscal 
decentralisation are instrumental in promoting economic growth for the developed 
countries. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that the impact of control over corruption on 
the economic growth is significantly positive both for the transition and developed 
economies while democratic accountability has positive association with economic 
growth for the developed countries and support for the growth enhancing strategies but 
not for the developing countries.  
Moreover, analysis shows that the process of fiscal decentralisation effective in the 
development process if it is complemented with institutions. Therefore, it is showed that 
the control over corruption and fiscal decentralisation both are complementary for the 
developed countries not for the developing countries and non-complementarity exists 
between fiscal decentralisation and democratic accountability.  
Furthermore, current study want to draw attention for the policy implication and 
the policy implication are: First, Developing countries should allocate excessive amount 
to the development and infrastructure project instead of the current expenditure. 
Therefore, the benefit of the fiscal decentralisation can achieve for the long term 
economic growth. Secondly, for the high and sustainable development of the developing 
the institutional quality needs to be strengthened. Thirdly, countries should make officials 
accountable without bargaining their ability to work and should focus on attention for the 
stable government policies. Fourth, Developing countries should specially focus on the 
corruption and should take step to control over corruption. Fifth, developing countries 
should broaden the tax base, due to this the capacity of revenue generation increase and it 
will also help to increase the documentation process in the country.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table-A1 
List of Sample Countries 
Sr. No. Name of the Countries Sr. No. Name of the Countries 
1 Argentina 23 Italy 
2 Australia 24 Jamaica 
3 Austria 25 Japan 
4 Belgium 26 Lithuania 
5 Bolivia 27 Luxembourg 
6 Canada 28 Malta 
7 Chile 29 Morocco 
8 Columbia 30 Netherlands 
9 Congo, Rep. 31 New Zealand 
10 Cyprus 32 Norway 
11 Denmark 33 Poland 
12 El Salvador 34 Portugal 
13 Estonia 35 Romania 
14 Finland 36 Russian Federation 
15 France 37 South Africa 
16 Germany 38 Spain 
17 Greece 39 Sweden 
18 Honduras 40 Switzerland 
19 Hungary 41 Turkey 
20 Iceland 42 United Kingdom 
21 Ireland 43 United States 
22 Israel   
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